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ABSTRACT  
This paper examines Long Term Care (LTC) in Greece over the crisis. It does so through 
examining micro data from the 2007 and 2015 waves of the Survey of Health, Ageing 
and Retirement and Europe (SHARE. The crisis was exceptionally deep and involved 
retrenchments in public welfare, superimposed on a familial LTC system. Hence, the 
‘austerity narrative’, expects cutbacks to have led to deteriorating outcomes and to 
rising informal provision. The empirical investigation casts doubt on these expectations: 
First, LTC needs did not rise, despite a deterioration in health. Second, ‘care gaps’ – 
people declaring need who receive no care – shrank, despite austerity. Third, it was 
(paid) professional care, rather than informal care which rose, despite the familial LTC 
system. Fourth, care in the last year of life is a further drain on family finances. The paper 
concludes with thoughts on whether expecting the family to keep delivering is a 
sustainable LTC medium term policy in the face of ageing. 
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1. Introduction  
This paper examines what happened in Greece over the crisis, focusing on long term 
care (LTC). It does so through a comparison of micro data spanning the crisis - responses 
by individuals in the same sample survey given in 2007 and 2015. Hard evidence on how 
specific individuals weathered the crisis can take the place of a priori theorising and 
casual empiricism which characterised much commentary on the Greek crisis. 
This paper sheds empirical light on the crisis and LTC by taking a first look at a unique 
data source released in late 2017, covering individuals aged 50+. Our aim is to give an 
overview and provide a narrative, examining descriptive statistics, privileging breadth 
over depth. 
We compare two waves of the same survey (SHARE – Survey of Health, Ageing and 
Retirement in Europe), conducted in 2007 and 2015. SHARE is large geographically and 
intertemporally comparable interdisciplinary survey3; Greece was part of it from the 
start (2004) up to 2009, but was unable to participate between 2011 and 2013. It re-
joined the sixth wave with an enlarged sample in 2015, allowing us detailed examination 
of what happened during the crisis years. This involves comparing two cross-sections – 
one just previous to the manifestation of the crisis, and the other between the second 
and third bailouts, 2015, when most of the crisis effects were in full evidence. We also 
make some use of the longitudinal dimension of SHARE – i.e. individuals who had 
answered both in 2007 and 2015. We supplement release 6.0.0 of the data with two 
components of SHARE not used before: exit interviews referring to the last year of life 
of individuals who died between waves, completed by relatives; we also examine a 
special paper-based drop off questionnaire completed by the Greek sample only. 
Examination of the crisis is of wider importance. The economic crisis in Greece was 
exceptionally long and deep, and changed many entrenched relationships in fiscal and 
social policy. Long term care for the aged was one of the specific areas most affected: it 
lies on the boundary between formal and informal care, between state and private, 
between social services and market provision. What happened during the crisis in LTC 
                                                     
3 Details on data are provided in Appendix 1 
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can shed light in four domains: the mechanics of the crisis, ageing, long term care and 
gender. More specifically: 
First, fiscal rebalancing and its impact on individuals. In LTC, before the crisis, the State 
was expanding its own role, a process interrupted by austerity. Needs for LTC, on the 
other hand, were unaffected. Families had to assume greater responsibility just as their 
own means were reduced. 
The second, is how ageing links to LTC. Greece is the second fastest ageing country in 
Europe, implying a growing demand for LTC, compounded possibly by crisis-related 
health deteriorations. Would the supply of LTC respond? Given the importance of 
informal care, the question amounts to the willingness of new cohorts of women, were 
used to economic independence, to supply more care. Would this mean gaps in 
provision? If not, how were they filled? 
The third field relates to LTC policy. LTC all over Europe is provided by a combination of 
public and private, professional and informal provision. Policy experimentation revolves 
shifts these boundaries, changing fiscal commitments whilst trying to maintain quality 
of care. In Greece the public/private mix was altered in a one-sided fashion. Did the 
family and civil society rise to the challenge, and if so, how? 
The fourth issue is gender. The crisis was not gender neutral: Women were the primary 
recipients of the crisis to-do-list; the needs of aged relatives were added to pressures on 
income and employment. It was up to families to provide an answer; it was up to their 
female members to put it into practice. 
The paper first sets the scene, providing background on the crisis: what happened to 
incomes, to health care, the institutions of LTC. The examination of LTC starts from the 
needs of care: did they grow and if so, for whom? How needs were met, the supply side, 
is the object of the next section: was it professional or family care that rose to meet the 
needs? The period of concentrated need, end of life care, is considered next, followed 
by aspects of gender. The conclusions offer an explanation of five apparent paradoxes 
uncovered by the analysis. 
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2. Setting the scene: Ageing, Gender and Austerity in the Greek 
context 
The Greek crisis was uniquely long and deep (Meghir et al. 2017; Lyberaki and Tinios, 
2017). GDP fell continuously from 2008 to 2016; the drop of GDP per head by a quarter 
is one of many indicators of individual hardship. The elderly were thought to have been 
hit especially hard, victims of cuts in pensions and health care, both results of austerity 
economics (Lyberaki, 2018). Women were also deemed heavily affected by the crisis 
(Karamessini, 2014). These impressions were carried over in international 
understanding (Papadimitriou and Zartaloudis, 2015) and individual experiences 
(Chalari, 2015). 
Two rival narratives attempt to make sense of developments. The anti-austerity 
narrative builds on fiscal developments to underline cuts in entitlements and dramatic 
falls in welfare (Karamesini and Rubery, 2014; Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 2012). 
Commentary stressed hardship and dramatized reality, especially in health (Kentikelenis 
et al. 2014) and social protection (Adam and Papatheodorou, 2016). On the other side 
are views stressing implementation and reform ownership (IMF, 2017; Meghir et al. 
2017). Pensions after 2010 were cut at least 12 times, while there were at least three 
major pension reform bills (Panageas and Tinios, 2017; Tinios, 2018). Health policy had 
to contend with an explosion of expenditure in the few years preceding the crisis, as well 
as a considerable reform backlog (Kanavos and Souliotis, 2017). 
What happened to incomes? The crisis’s most prominent impact was on incomes, 
(Lyberaki 2018; Tinios, 2018). This is reflected in the SHARE sample -Table 1: The median 
income of persons aged 50+ declined sharply for all age groups, by 10% on average. The 
impact, though, was far from even: those of working age (50-64) saw the most dramatic 
decline (by 13%), followed by the older groups (decline by 7%). These impacts are 
mirrored by private disposable income per capita (down by 23%), while the age 
difference is also met in EU-SILC data. As discussed in Lyberaki (2018) and Tinios (2018), 
those employed lost on average more than retirees. Homemakers, mainly women, 
entered the crisis with lower incomes and saw them decline by 12%4. Macroeconomic 
                                                     
4 In contrast, average incomes were rising for the SHARE sample as a whole, in absolute and in relative terms. The 
largest increase was in the Nordic countries (30%) and the Eastern countries (37%) (Lyberaki, 2018). 
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data and EU SILC data covering the population of all ages show that falls were even 
greater for the population at large.  
Table 1: Change in median/mean income and in relative income position by age group, cross 
sectional analysis SHARE w2 (2006/7) and w6 (2015) 
Source: SHARE Wave 2 (2007) and Wave 6 (2015), Release: 6.0.0, March 31st 2017. Figures for 
EU SILC median income; GDP per capita and private disposable income per capita have been 
obtained from Eurostat. 
Note: Median equivalent income is set equal to 100 for the 50+ population in each wave. Values 
greater than 100 indicate income status above the median of the 50+ population. 
 
SHARE wave 2  
and wave 6 
Median Income (EUR) Change Indexed (50+ median=100) 
wave 2 wave 6     (%) wave 2 wave 6 
Greece: 
Total 
 
50-64 7044 6130 -13.0 95 92 
65-80 7668 7205 -6.0 104 108 
80+ 6600 6118 -7.3 89 92 
50+ 7397 6647 -10.1 100 100 
       
Greece: 
Pensioners 
50-64 9520 9000 -5.5 129 135 
65-80 7800 8000 2.6 105 120 
80+ 6720 6400 -4.8 91 96 
50+ 7836 7627 -2.7 106 115 
       
Greece: 
Employed 
50-64 6602 6303 -4.5 89 95 
65-80 9000 6056 -32.7 122 91 
50+ 7000 6250 -10.7 95 94 
Memorandum items 
 2007 2016 Change   
EU SILC median income 18+ 10307 7676 -25.5   
EU SILC median income 65+ 8767 7816 -10.8   
GDP per capita (EUR) nominal 21100 16200 -23.2   
Private disposable income per capita 18990 14539 -23.4   
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Health-care was a major concern in the retrenchments and structural reform effort from 
2010. Considerable retrenchment of expenditure in the initial period was able to claw-
back some of the rise in expenditure in 2000-2010. Structural change affected health 
insurance, which was consolidated into a single insurance- single buyer system while 
primary care shifted towards a family-doctor referral system. Souliotis et al. (2016) 
explain there is a growing unwillingness of citizens to pay informally, just as demands 
for these payments are growing. According to Kyriopoulos et al. (2014), 25% of chronic 
patients face geographical barriers while two out of three are facing financial barriers in 
access (most of them being unemployed, low-income and low-educated). 
A recent study (GBD-G 2018) provides a careful analysis of available morbidity and 
mortality indicators: mortality trends (and to a lesser extent morbidity) sharply 
deteriorated in Greece during the crisis. This was mainly due to acceleration of ageing, 
and to unhealthy behaviour (smoking, BMI, diet). Even so, the fall of per capita health 
expenditure, combined with ‘rooted inefficiencies’ of health care was linked to health 
outcomes. Their overall conclusion is agnostic as to causation but is unequivocal as to ‘a 
disproportionate decrement in the health of Greeks, which parallels the course of the 
economic crisis’ (p. 404). 
Problems to access health care are reflected in the SHARE 2015 drop-off, one in three 
persons aged 65+ did not visit a doctor or a dentist because of cost (Figure 1), while 
more than one out of five elderly has forgone health services such as prevention, 
necessary diagnostic test or changing eyeglasses. 
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Figure 1: Forgone health care due to cost over the period 2010-2015, Greece persons aged 65+ 
in 2015 
 
Source: SHARE wave 6 (2015) Drop-off module. 
 
Greece is ageing fast. The Ageing Report 2018 expects the 65+ population to increase 
by 12.5 percentage points by 2070, when it will account for 33.9% of the total, from 
21.4% today (EPC 2018). The 80+ group will account for 16.6% of total, up from 6.6% 
today, both figures at the top end of the EU.  
Despite this, ageing does not feature in narratives of the Greek crisis. This is surprising. 
Commentary deals almost exclusively with pensions. Other ageing-related issues pass 
unremarked: Attention is focused on the projected fall in the total population (driven by 
low birth rates and fall in migration) but is hardly aware of other issues that longevity 
poses, such as the need to work longer. In consequence, there is little support for active 
ageing, while employment policy discourages older people working.  
Turning to the gender dimension, women are thought especially affected by austerity 
(Karamessini, 2014). One of the observed features of the crisis was a wave of early 
retirements chiefly by women, encouraged by legislation effectively lowering retirement 
ages for them in the period before 2015 (Panageas and Tinios, 2017). Did these women 
retire early in order to take on care responsibilities, in the manner suggested, for 
example, by Loretto and Vickerstaff (2015) or by Ni Léime and Street (2017)? 
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An important gender consideration to take on board are the large differences between 
cohorts in Greece. Women born in the 1950s started retiring during the crisis. Their 
involvement in the labour market was very different to previous cohorts. Lyberaki (2017) 
notes that 64% women born before 1930 had never worked, whereas for those born in 
the 1950s this was only 37% (see Figure 2). Τhis is also probably reflected in the 
prevalence of the ‘added worker effect’, among women: Women who were previously 
out of the work force (yet had worked in the past) entered the labour market in large 
numbers. (Lyberaki and Tinios, 2014). The opposite held for men, who left the labour 
market discouraged of job search. 
 
Figure 2: Transition from education to the labour market Greece, persons aged 50+  
 
Source: Lyberaki, 2017, from SHARELIFE data. 
 
Turning to long term care (LTC), this is seen in Greece as a job for the family.  
Figure 3, from SHARE 20045 charts people’s opinions of who should have responsibility 
for care of the aged – State or family. We see a North-South gradient, with Greece being 
an outlier – even in the South. 
 
                                                     
5 Lyberaki, 2009; Lyberaki and Tinios, 2010; Lyberaki et al. 2013. 
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Figure 3: Perceptions on family’s role in care provision, SHARE wave 1 
 
Source: SHARE wave 1 (2004/2005). 
 
The ‘informal welfare state’ (Lyberaki and Tinios, 2014) relied on women. Despite 
formally stated intentions, the process of ‘recalibration and reform’ (Ferrera, 2010) 
strengthening formal social protection had hardly advanced. As a result, the crisis found 
Greece without a functioning social safety net, implying that much of the emergency 
social protection had to be provided by the family. 
 
Box 1: Has Austerity obliterated LTC? A story in Greek statistics 
Information on public LTC is patchy and inconsistent. One of the sources most cited are 
the projections of the EU Ageing Working Group (AWG), which in its reports (AWG 2018, 
2015) mentions current public expenditure before projecting forward to 2060 and 
beyond. For the case of Greece, the AWG published wildly different estimates, indicating 
a dramatic decline from 1.4% of GDP in 2009 to 0.1% in 2018 -with no apparent 
justification. In the 2015 AWG, beneficiaries were reported as 288 thousand receiving 
LTC cash benefits; who appeared to have lost it. Greece thus is held to be the only bailout 
country for which austerity has led to absolute falls in the public LTC supplied.  
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However, the reason for this is nothing to do with austerity, but plenty to do with ‘Greek 
statistics’. The 2015 figure was larger, as it included a cash benefit directed specifically 
to paraplegics; for reasons unknown, this was not included in the 2018 figures. More 
importantly, neither report includes estimates for the Help at Home programme, run by 
municipalities with structural funds finance, nor of residential care, financed by 
municipalities, the church and NGOs. When looking aτ ESSPROS data, LTC spending 
seems to have increased from €105.1 million to €126.7 million in 2015, but as noted by 
the Social Protection Working Group, LTC data and health care data cannot be easily 
separated. 
Pending a fuller investigation (see appendix) it is not possible to say that retrenchment 
has hit LTC. However, we may still conclude that LTC in Greece exists in a kind of public 
finance ‘black hole’ – being almost invisible to policy makers.  
This observation is particularly worrisome given the size of the ageing challenge. Going 
back to the 2018 AWG report, the scenario that asks the hypothetical convergence 
question of Greece with the rest of the EU, results in public expenditure  28 times greater 
its baseline value (5.6% of GDP rather than 0.2%).  We may conclude from this, that the 
ageing challenge for LTC remains. 
It is indubitable that the formal provision of personal long-term care is small and uneven 
(Tinios, 2016). Public involvement was traditionally provided in medicalized form by the 
hospital sector and in outdated residential care institutions, frequently charitable 
institutions set up decades before (see Appendix 2). These were supplemented after 
2000 by the Help-at-Home Programme, which delivered personal and practical at 
people’s homes. Long-term care for the elderly in Greece, can be summarized in a Table 
2, relating the type/setting of care provision (care homes, home-based care, day care 
centres) to ‘who provides care’ (public sector, non-profit organizations, private sector, 
informal care provision). 
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Table 2: Long-Term Care for the elderly: the state of the art in Greece 
Greece: 
Long-term care 
provision 
who provides care 
Public sector 
Non-profit 
organizations 
Private 
sector Informal care 
Ty
p
e
 o
f 
ca
re
 p
ro
vi
si
o
n
 
Home-
based care 
Care is provided 
through the ‘Help 
at home’ 
Programme 
Non-significant 
 
Private 
companies 
 
Care provided 
by family, 
friends or 
third parties 
Care 
homes 
Limited number of 
care homes 
owned by public 
sector 
 
Owned and 
managed by the 
Orthodox Church 
or other non-
profit 
organisations 
Private 
companies 
 
 
 
N/A 
 
Day care 
centres 
Day care centres 
at municipality 
level N/A 
Non-
significant. N/A 
Other 
Allowance N/A n/a 
 
N/A 
 
Needs for care were met through two mechanisms: (a) by the unregulated private carer 
market, which grew enormously in the 1990s owing to the availability of supply provided 
by immigrant women and (b) by informal unpaid provision on the part of women to 
members of their family. The two sectors are linked; the rise in female labour 
participation since 1995 was associated with the rise in immigration from the Balkans 
and Eastern Europe (Lyberaki, 2011). The paid-for market is being squeezed since the 
crisis by falls in supply as many of the first wave immigrants return home, as a result of 
the crisis; this market could also be affected by rises in the tax obligations of self-
employed workers. 
 
 
 
11 
3. The need for care: The Demand side  
How does Greece compare with other countries? We approach this issue by looking at 
the need (demand) for care in the conventional way – by examining reported limitations 
in Activities of Daily Living (ADL) (e.g. Clark, 2004) by age groups (Table 3). The following 
text box makes clear that the definition of need for care used in different countries 
varies. Our choice of self-declared ADLs follows practice in the US and elsewhere; in the 
absence of other definitions it is useful to benchmark across countries. One should bear 
in mind that bureaucratic use could apply different criteria and could differ from self-
assessment. Reporting an inability to perform a particular task may be affected by 
bureaucratic notions of severity, if need has been ascertained by a formal process. This 
being said, given that the respondent is simply asked whether he/she can perform some 
activities unaided, reporting ADL may have a lower subjective variation than, say, 
reporting on health status.  
Box 2: Limitations in Activities of Daily Life 
Six activities are included in the SHARE questionnaire, following identical formulations 
in the US HRS and UK ELSA i) Dressing, including putting on shoes/socks; ii) Walking 
across a room; iii) Bathing or showering; iv) Eating, such as cutting up your food; v) 
Getting in and out of bed; vi) Using the toilet, including getting up or down. 
Instrumental activities of daily life (IADL): Seven activities are included: i) Using a map 
to figure out how to get around in a strange place; ii) Preparing a hot meal; iii) Shopping 
for groceries; iv) Making telephone calls; v) Taking medications; vi) Doing work around 
the house or garden; vii) Managing money, such as paying bills and keeping track of 
expenses. 
The eleven countries (in addition to Greece) that participated both in SHARE wave 2 
(2007) and SHARE wave 6 (2015) are categorized for convenience in four clusters: 
Nordics (DK and SE), Continental (DE, BE, FR, CH and AT), Southern (IT and ES) and 
Eastern (PL and CZ). Though the membership of the clusters is familiar, they do not entail 
accepting any of the established schemes of categorisation.  
A recurring theme in virtually all SHARE work is the North-South gradient, where there 
is a tight clustering in country groupings. However, the North-South gradient seems 
 
 
12 
absent in the needs for care. That, at least for Greece is absent; it has much lower 
percentages of persons in need of care than the European average, both for men and 
women. Indeed, Greece in ADL limitations is closer to the Nordic (i.e. Sweden and 
Denmark) than the Southern countries for both age groups. Other Southern European 
countries for people over 80 (37.8%) are in 2015 by 12 percentage points more likely 
than Greece (25.5%) to report at least one ADL limitation. In contrast, Instrumental ADLs 
show less differentiation, or differences between waves. 
Table 3: Persons 65+ with at least 1 ADL limitation, by age group, cross sectional analysis, wave 
2 and wave 6 
SHARE W2-W6 (%) of persons with at least one ADL 
Change w2-w6 in p.p. 
Persons 65+ Wave 2 (2007) Wave 6 (2015) 
Country 65-80 80+ 65-80 80+ 65-80 80+ 
Nordics 8.8 28.5 8.6 22.4 -0.2 -6.1 
Continental 11.5 35.8 12.6 35.8 1.1 0.0 
Southern 12.5 37.4 11.0 37.8 -1.5 0.4 
Greece 8.4 32.8 8.9 25.5 0.5 -7.3 
Eastern 25.3 47.7 16.1 39.5 -9.2 -8.2 
Total 13.2 36.9 12.2 36.0 -1.0 -0.9 
         
SHARE W2-W6 (%) of persons with at least one iadl 
Change w2-w6 in p.p. 
Persons 65+ Wave 2 (2007) Wave 6 (2015) 
Country 65-80 80+ 65-80 80+ 65-80 80+ 
Nordics 14.2 43.6 13.3 40.1 -0.9 -3.5 
Continental 16.6 49.9 16.3 50.4 -0.3 0.5 
Southern 22.2 53.2 17.2 53.6 -5.0 0.4 
Greece 25.4 60.7 24.8 58.1 -0.6 -2.6 
Eastern 34.7 64.1 26.0 59.1 -8.7 -5.0 
Total 20.6 52.2 17.9 52.2 -2.7 -0.1 
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How have the needs for care changed over the crisis? Needs are largely determined by 
physiology. In theory, given ageing, as well as cuts in health care (the austerity narrative), 
one would have expected a rise in the demand (needs) for care. However, no such 
tendency is seen. We may even say that the opposite holds: needs for persons of age 
80+ as measured by ADLs drop in Greece over the crisis, especially among women, where 
the drop is statistically significant (Figure 4). For other age groups there is definitely no 
increase -needs remain unchanged. More specifically, a cross-section analysis between 
wave 2 (2007, before the economic crisis) and wave 6 (2015, after economic crisis), 
showed that 20% of men age 80+ reported ADL limitations in 2015 -a decrease of 5 
percentage points compared to 2007- while the percentage for women of age 80+ was 
29% in 2015, down from 38 % in 2007.  
Figure 4: Changes in ADL limitations, 2007-2015, persons 65+, Greece 
 
Source: SHARE Wave 2 (2007) and Wave 6 (2015), Release: 6.0.0, March 31st 2017.  
Note: A t-test has been employed to test the difference in adl prevalence between wave 2 and 
wave 6 ***, ** and * mean that the estimated figures for wave 6 are significantly different 
compared to those of wave 2 at  0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level respectively. 
 
ADLs should be, at least roughly, related to health status. That, however, is worsening: 
Almost all groups (except men of age 80+), report overall self-perceived health to be 
worse in 2015 than 2007 (Figure 5). Self-perceived health for men of age 65-80 ‘less than 
good’ rose to 35.0% in 2015 (from 27.7%) and equivalently for women (46.3% from 
40.5%). For the 80+, self-perceived health went separate ways for the two genders: bad 
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health dropped for men and rose for women. GBD-G 2018, examining administrative 
outcome data concur with this fall. 
This leads us to a first ‘paradox’: although health is worse, it does not lead to higher ADL 
limitations, but lower. Less healthy people are, nevertheless, no less active.  
The paradox cannot be seen independent of gender: women report ADL limitations in 
higher percentages than men, while their health is worse, even controlling for age. 
However, women appear to be more stoic– they report ADL limitations in lower 
percentages compared to 2007, while the gap between them and men is smaller in 2015 
than in 2007. This stoicism – more marked after 80 – implies that, as crisis-related needs 
of other family members are mounting, older women stress their own LTC needs less. 
Older cohorts of women may have been conditioned through their lives to defer to male 
relatives; so, they do not showcase their own needs, in order ‘not to be difficult’. 
Figure 5: Changes in self-perceived bad health, 2007-2015, persons 65+, Greece 
 
Source: SHARE Wave 2 (2007) and Wave 6 (2015), Release: 6.0.0, March 31st 2017.  
Note: A t-test has been employed to test the difference in the less than good health prevalence 
between wave 2 and wave 6. ***, ** and * mean that the estimated figures for wave 6 are 
significantly different compared to those of wave 2 at  0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level respectively. 
 
How is the need for care linked to income? Looking at the in-need-of-care risk by 
income quartiles, Figure 6 suggests that while before the crisis there was no clear 
association between income and ADL limitations (controlling for age), in wave 6 the 
relationship changed: A clear negative relationship emerges for the very old (80+), 
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though not for the younger group; the poorest quarter are twice as likely to be in need 
of care as the richest one. It is also interesting to note that the level of need is much 
reduced for the two ends of the distribution. 
Figure 6: Persons 65 with at least 1 adl limitation, by age and income status, cross section wave 
2 & wave 6, Greece 
 
Note: Income quartiles are defined based on the distribution of the equivalent income for 50+. 
 
Adding dynamics: Did the changes in income lead to a change in the need for care? To 
address this question, we turn to the panel sample (i.e. persons who participate in both 
wave 2 and wave 6). 
Table 4 presents income rises and falls between 2007 and 2015 in Greece by gender. 
The average fall masks considerable heterogeneity, and is the product of sharp and 
diverging movements, both up and down. Some 40% of people aged 65-80 in 2007 (wave 
2) say their income fell by more than a third in 2015 (wave 6); this is counterbalanced 
by a quarter who note rises higher than 15%. The differentiation applies sharply to 
gender: Sharp income decreases are more pronounced among elderly women than for 
men; the reverse holds for income rises (21.3% of women vis-à-vis 27.7% of men). This 
differentiation is most likely due to the treatment of widows’ pensions after 2010. 
Changes in income appear linked with care needs for elderly women, but not for men 
(Figure 7). The proportion of women aged 65-80 in wave 2 (2007) with some ADL 
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limitations for the first time in wave 6 reaches 15% for those whose income fell by more 
than 30%, and declines with income falls. For men, in contrast, no such relationship is 
evident. (it should be noted that average ages are similar across the income categories). 
For the older group, this relationship is not as obvious – probably due to the prevalence 
of widows amongst those with large income falls.  
 
Table 4: Categories based on change in income between wave 2 and wave 6 of persons aged 
65+ by gender, panel sample Greece 
Panel 
sample 
Greece 
Change (%) in income between wave 2 and wave 6,  
Panel sample of persons 65 plus in wave 6 
> -30% 
-30% 
to -15% 
-15% 
to -5% 
-5% 
to +5% 
5% 
to 15% > +15% Total 
Men 37.8 12.5 9.4 5.9 3.0 31.4 100.0 
Women 39.2 11.7 10.8 7.2 3.8 27.3 100.0 
Total 38.6 12.1 10.2 6.6 3.5 29.1 100.0 
 
Figure 7: Panel sample w2-w6, Greece: Changes in the in-need-of-care status across waves, by 
changes in income status between w2 & w6, persons aged 65-80 in w2 
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4. The supply side: informal care provision 
Box 3: Definitions – Professional and Informal Care 
Professional care: Includes any professional or paid services received in own home such 
as: i. Help with personal care, (e.g. getting in and out of bed, dressing, bathing); ii. Help 
with domestic tasks (e.g. cleaning, ironing, cooking); iii. Meals-on-wheels (i.e. ready-
made meals provided by a municipality or a private provider); and iv. Help with other 
activities (e.g. filling a drug dispenser. 
Informal care/help: This indicator equals to one if a person either receives informal 
care/help from outside the household on a daily or weekly frequency or/and receives 
personal care regularly from someone in the household. Consequently, the indicator 
equals zero if a person receives neither help/care from a person outside the household, 
nor from a person within the household. 
 
How are needs met?  
Looking at the European landscape as a whole, formal provision dominates in the north 
and the family in the south. Formal in the SHARE questionnaire comprises professional 
care – whether paid for by the State, or out of pocket by the family. The role of family 
and friends in care to the elderly in Southern and Eastern countries is far more 
important, than in Continental and Nordic countries (Figure 8). In Southern countries, 
54.6% receive informal care only; the respective share is 19.1% in the Nordic and in 
Continental countries 22.2%. On the other hand, receiving both at the same time is 
characteristic in Continental countries (56.0%). Informal care, thus, plays a role 
everywhere, even where social protection dominates over other delivery modes. Greece 
follows the South in the overall importance of the family. However, regarding the low 
value of exclusively formal care, it is closer to Eastern countries; this might reflect that 
quality is lower, or that exclusively formal care is insufficient to meet needs. 
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Figure 8: Care mix (%), of persons 65+ with at least one adl limitation who receive any type of 
care, SHARE wave 6 
 
Source: SHARE Wave 6 (2015), Release: 6.0.0, March 31st 2017.  
 
Did the crisis leave more needs unmet in Greece? A perusal of newspaper headlines on 
‘the humanitarian crisis’ predisposes for a widening care deficit. If we factor in the 
ageing narrative, this expectation would only be reinforced.  
But, contrary to expectations, care gaps – the percentage who expressed need for care 
(ADLs), but received none – shrank (Figure 9). This is less marked for women than for 
men- but applies for both genders and age categories. Taking the 65+ sample, measured 
gaps fell from 29 to 18 % for men and from 33 to 23 % for women. Comparing this with 
the picture on needs, the fall in care gaps is larger than any fall in the care needs, though 
it affects the same groups6.  
How was the gap filled? Contrary to expectations it is not informal provision that rose, 
but formal (professional) care. Whereas in 2007 16% of those in need received formal 
care (Figure 10), that rose to 33% (7% exclusively formal and 26% in combination). The 
percentage of exclusively informal fell, even though total informal rose (61% to 72%).  
 
 
 
                                                     
6 Standard errors are large due to sample size. Though care gaps for ADL>2  moved in the same way, 
differences were not statistically significant. However, the one-tailed test that gaps rose was rejected.  
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Figure 9: Changes in the care gap (no care received) of persons 65+ with at least one ADL, by 
gender and age, SHARE wave 2-wave 6, cross section 
 
Source: SHARE Wave 2 (2007) and Wave 6 (2015), Release: 6.0.0, March 31st 2017.  
Note: A t-test for the difference between wave 2 and wave 6. ***, ** and * showed w6 is 
significantly different compared to those of wave 2 at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level respectively. 
 
 
When we disaggregate data by income status (Figure 10) three observations stand out: 
First, care gaps were more common among the richest in 2007, comparing the top with 
the bottom quarter of the income distribution. The difference was made up by greater 
incidence of informal care for the poorest. Second, care gaps shrank between wave 2 
and wave 6 for all income groups. The relationship by income disappears in wave 6– all 
groups are equally likely to have unmet needs. Third, the response to needs is for all 
income classes due to an increase in formal, rather than informal care. Having said this, 
even the rich are able to mobilise greater informal support.  
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Figure 10: Persons 65+ with at least one ADL: (%) who have received any care/help and care mix 
of care received, by income status, Greece, cross sectional w2 & w6 
 
 
Lower care gaps in 2015 affect all types of households. Those living alone are not more 
prone to care gap, though they do have to rely on formal care to a greater extent. (Figure 
11). 
 
Figure 11: Persons 65+ with at least one adl: (%) who have received any care/help and care mix 
of care received, by type of household, Greece, cross sectional w2 & w6 
 
Source: SHARE Wave 2 (2007) and Wave 6 (2015), Release: 6.0.0, March 31st 2017.  
 
Did the care mix change over the crisis? The austerity narrative predisposes that formal 
care should have fallen; family incomes were squeezed, and state provision was under 
threat. Again, the opposite holds: Figure 12 shows that changes in the care mix between 
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2007 and 2015 are due to greater formal (meaning professional) care and not informal 
care. The shift was more notable for people over 80 and for women of all ages. This, 
admittedly, happened against a background where informal help still dominates. 
 
Figure 12: Composition of total care received by type of care, persons with 1+ ADL limitation, by 
gender and age, Greece, wave 2- wave 6, cross section 
 
Source: SHARE Wave 2 (2007) and Wave 6 (2015), Release: 6.0.0, March 31st 2017.  
 
This is paradoxical for two reasons: first, austerity limited (or at least did not increase) 
the provision of care by public bodies. Second, family consolidation meant that there 
was a movement of generations to pool resources by moving in together (often from a 
flat in the same building). Figure 13 illustrates this response to the crisis- elderly 
households accommodating grown children. Both factors should shift the care mix 
towards informal care – which they clearly did not. The paradox thickens.  
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Figure 13: Proximity to the nearest child, persons 65+, cross section 
 
Source: SHARE Wave 2 (2007) and Wave 6 (2015), Release: 6.0.0, March 31st 2017.  
 
How did households secure more formal long-term care?  The apparent paradox is 
explained once we take on board that formal care includes professional bought-in care, 
paid out of pocket by families (Figure 14). What is happening is that Greek families are 
paying to access care services. Eliciting respondents’ cooperation for financial 
information is notoriously hard in Greece, implying that sample sizes of positive replies 
are small and values underestimated.7 Even so, the amounts involved are non-negligible 
and are paid across the income distribution.  
Median amounts of out-of-pocket expenditure are approximately €600/year, an amount 
not small for Greeks amid austerity. As a point of reference, in December 2016, 
administrative data (Helios) show mean the monthly pension was EUR 820 (the median 
around EUR 700) -with large differences across gender- and with the modal value at the 
private sector minimum pension (EUR 420) (‘Helios data’). For the majority, therefore 
LTC expenses amounted to a monthly pension or more.  
One possible economic explanation proposed by Lyberaki et al. (2017) is that pensions 
fell by less than wages of carers, implying a relative price fall for private LTC. Hence 
pensioners find it easier to devote funds (even from a shrinking overall family budget) 
to provide care for family members.  
                                                     
7 Those aged 65+ who paid out of pocket are 54 persons (observations), 22 living as a couple and 32 living 
alone.  
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Figure 14: Paid out-of pocket for professional care received, persons 65+, Greece, w6 
 
Source: SHARE Wave 6 (2015), Release: 6.0.0, March 31st 2017.  
 
Adding dynamics: Trying to examine how the changes in the care gap between 2007 
and 2015 are associated with the changes in income over the same period, Figure 15 
looks at persons in-need-of-care in both wave 2 and wave 6 (panel sample). We look at 
how these needs are met across waves, depending on the changes in income status. 
Given that these people needed LTC in both waves, they are most likely to have been 
exposed to austerity and other supply shocks. 
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Figure 15: Panel sample of persons with at least one adl in both waves: (%) who have received 
any care/help and care mix of care received, by change in income, Greece, panel sample w2 & 
w6 
 
Source: Panel sample, SHARE Wave 2 (2007) and Wave 6 (2015), Release: 6.0.0, March 31st 
2017.  
Note: * N= 31. **N= 37. 
 
Persons whose income did not fall between 2007 and 2015 saw a big decrease in the 
care gap (from 39% in 2007 to 20% in 2015), largely driven by the increasing inflows from 
both professional and informal care (from 17% in 2007 to 39% in 2015). For this group, 
inflows of exclusively informal care fell from 40% in 2007 to 35% in 2015. Care gaps also 
fell, though by less, for those whose income decreased between 2007 and 2015; care 
gaps in 2015 are 24%, down from 40% in 2007. 
 
5. A first look at exit interviews: Care in the last year of life 
What happens when needs reach their peak, in the last year of a person’s life? Do the 
same mechanisms react, but to a greater extent? Are there other mechanisms 
activated? Or, do greater needs translate into higher care gaps?  
These critical questions for individual well-being can be approached for the first time by 
an analysis of SHARE exit interviews – given by relatives of w2 panel members who died 
between 2007 and 2015. This in Greece comprised 350 individuals, around ten percent 
of the w2 sample. 
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Dying at home or in institutions: Even when controlling for the cause of death (e.g. 
disease) a remarkable North-South gradient appears in the share who lived in a nursing 
home or hospice over their last year. Figure 16 shows that, excluding cancer, more than 
one out of three persons in the North spent their last year in a nursing home; this falls 
to 22% in the Continental countries, and almost disappears in the South and in Greece 
(2%). More than one out of two (55%) died at home in Greece twice the share of the 
Nordics (28%).  
Figure 16: Place of decease, by cause of death SHARE wave 5 and wave 6 
 
Source: SHARE wave 5 (2013) and SHARE wave 6 (2015) exit interviews. 
Notes: (i) ‘Home’ includes: at his/her home, at another person’s home, at some other place. 
‘Nursing home’ includes dying in a nursing home, in a residential home or in a hospice. 
 
How did needs develop in the last year? Figure 17 shows people who encountered 
difficulties with ADLs in the last year. Even controlling for the cause of death, that 
exceeds 60%, well above the corresponding figure of persons of the same age (as 
analysed in the previous section). The rise in needs is thus amply confirmed. Needs both 
affect a greater percentage of the group and are more severe. There is remarkable 
dispersion in the extent of need across Europe- possibly unexpected for something 
physiologically determined. Greece once more is at variance with other Southern 
countries, showing a pattern of ADLs similar to the Nordic and Continental countries. 
 
36
24
39 36 33 28 32
42
55
38
38 60
57 63
59
37
46
52
43
51
25
16
4 2 8
36
22
6 2 12
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Nordics Cont/tal Southern Greece Eastern Nordics Cont/tal Southern Greece Eastern
Cause of death: cancer Cause of death: other than cancer
Place of dying, by main cause of death home hospital nursing home
 
 
26 
Figure 17: Number of ADL during the last year of life, by gender and cause of death 
 
Source: SHARE wave 5 (2013) and SHARE wave 6 (2015) exit interviews. 
Did the increasing needs result in higher care gaps? Figure 18 suggests that when needs 
rise, mechanisms are activated to address them: those with >3 ADLs and who did not 
receive any care is negligible everywhere. Conversely, even in their last year, less intense 
ADLs, are associated with higher care gaps; 16% in the Southern countries did not 
receive care, though Greece displays the lowest care gaps for every category of ADLs.  
 
Figure 18: Care gap during the last year of life, by adl status SHARE wave 5 & wave 6 
 
Source: SHARE wave 5 (2013) and SHARE wave 6 (2015) exit interviews. 
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Mechanisms which are activated to deal with the peak of needs: Mechanisms that meet 
needs in the last year fall into four mutually exclusive categories: i) living in a nursing 
home; ii) receiving only professional help/care (not in a nursing home); iii) receiving both 
professional and informal care (not in a nursing home); and iv) receiving only informal 
care. Figure 19 suggests that in all countries the complementarity of types of care 
increases. In the absence of specialised structures, Southern countries and Greece do 
not increase involvement of nursing homes care or purely professional care. Both formal 
and professional care respond to greater need: in Greece, half of those with 3+ ADLs, 
received only informal care. 
 
Figure 19: Care mix during the last year of life, by the number of adl SHARE w5 & w6 
 
Source: SHARE wave 5 (2013) and SHARE wave 6 (2015) exit interviews. 
Note: N 1 or 2 adl: Nordics (#118), Continental (#211), Southern (#264), Greece (#80), Eastern 
(#314).  
N 3 to 6 adl: Nordics (#314), Continental (#542), Southern (#640), Greece (#133), Eastern (#587).  
 
Differences in family arrangements do not affect care gaps but, as before, alter the care 
mix. Figure 20 shows this applying everywhere- albeit to a different extent. In Greece 
solely informal care concerns 47% of persons who were not married at death and have 
no or only one child, while the figure for those who were married and had 2 or more 
children was 64%. The absence of a family network is compensated by increasing 
exclusively professional care (even in the South) and by residential care. 
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Figure 20: Care mix during the last year of life, by family status at the moment of death, SHARE 
w5 & w6 
 
Source: SHARE wave 5 (2013) and SHARE wave 6 (2015) exit interviews. 
Note: N, non-married < 1 child: Nordics (#81), Continental (#149), Southern (#157), Greece 
(#47), Eastern (#171).  
N married with 2+ children: Nordics (#170), Continental (#294), Southern (#374), Greece (#47), 
Eastern (#361). 
 
Out of pocket expenses for the last year of life.  Greece has the highest proportion 
(83%) of persons who paid –out-of-pocket for health care during their last year (Figure 
21); Out of pocket costs for LTC are not noted, probably as the proxy replying would not 
have that information8.  The median cost over the last year (in EUR) for those who paid 
is estimated EUR 550 in Greece. The figure is comparable to out of pocket costs for the 
entire Greek sample, despite the greater potential for underreporting. Still, the average 
hides considerable dispersion, evidenced by the distance between the median and the 
75th percentile of the distribution as well as the entire distribution; a substantial minority 
were subject to catastrophic expenses. Figure 22 reports the out of pocket expenses for 
the median, 25th and 75th percentile, normalised by the country mean income.  In 
addition to the familiar North-South gradient, the South and East are characterised by 
greater dispersion.  
                                                     
8 We must remember that the respondent is a relative (proxy) who may not be in a position to know.  
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Figure 21: % of persons who paid out-of-pocket for health care during the last year of life, SHARE 
w5 & w6 
 
Source: SHARE wave 5 (2013) and SHARE wave 6 (2015) exit interviews. 
Note: Include only costs not paid or reimbursed by the health insurance or the employer for 
types of medicare such as: care from a general practitioner/ care from specialist physicians/ 
hospital stays/ care in a nursing home/ hospice stays/ medication/ aids and appliances/ help 
with personal care due to disability/ help with domestic tasks due to disability. 
 
Figure 22: Amount paid out-of-pocket for health care during the last year of life as % of SHARE 
mean income, SHARE w5 & w6 
 
Source: SHARE wave 5 (2013) and SHARE wave 6 (2015) exit interviews., normalized by mean 
income for SHARE sample 50+. 
Note: Include only costs not paid or reimbursed by the health insurance or the employer for 
types of medicare. 
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6. The gender dimension: Women, work and care 
We know that during the crisis women worked more, they were looking for work more 
and were also retiring earlier (section 2). So, who provides the care needed to close the 
care gaps? Figure 23 compares the extent to which retirees and non-retirees provide 
daily care by 5 -year age group from the ages of 50 to 69. Women retirees provide more 
care; men less. This effect is reversed after the ‘normal’ retirement age of 65. This could 
be interpreted in two ways; either women are led to early retirement to provide care 
or, early retirement makes them more available to provide care. It is interesting to note 
that this sharp difference between retirees and non-retirees, was not a feature of the 
situation in 2007. The same goes for gender gaps; gender gaps in care provision widened 
strikingly in wave 6 among retirees, but shrank among non-retirees.  
 
Figure 23: Carers on a daily basis: (%) of persons who provided care (daily) to a person outside 
and/or within the household, Greece SHARE wave 6 
 
 
The gender difference could be linked to time use patterns. The first ever time use 
survey in Greece was conducted in 2013. That revealed that the contribution of help 
with domestic tasks on the part of men, when their spouses are working, was the 
smallest in Europe (Lyberaki and Tinios, 2016; Lyberaki, 2017).  
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7. Conclusions 
What happened in long term care during the crisis can be summarized as a tangle of five 
paradoxes:  
 Care needs remained stable or even fell, despite ageing and worsening self-
perceived health, especially among older women. 
 Care gaps shrank, despite limited and retrenched public provision.  
 Gaps were filled by an increase in professional and not in informal family-provided 
unpaid care.  
 This took place despite observed family consolidation – pulling in incomes and care 
resources together. So, families used their strained financial resources to buy and 
pay for more care.  
 The incidence of out-of-pocket payments for care grew across the income spectrum 
despite falling incomes. 
Given what we know about the informal welfare state, as well as the pre-crisis 
characteristics of LTC provision, the ‘normal’ reaction one would have expected is the 
family stepping in to meet demand. This would have been a heavily gendered process. 
It would be women that would have to devote more time resources and emotional 
energy to care for their relatives and friends. 
Instead, what we see, is that gaps are filled by greater reliance on the market. Women, 
rather than staying at home to look after relatives, are doing the opposite: Even women 
who were homemakers before the crisis, are entering the labour market, looking for 
work to make up for income shortfalls affecting their household–the ‘added worker 
effect’. Indeed, one would expect that at least some of the increased supply of 
‘professional’ bought in services is supplied by some women previously providing unpaid 
work within the family. Rather than women staying at home to look after elderly 
relatives, they prefer to try to find work themselves and employ other women for the 
extra care work generated. 
Economic factors during the crisis reinforced this process. It brought about a major 
redistribution of income. First, medium to low pensions fell by less than earnings from 
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work (by around 14%). Second, more of the adjustment was shifted to private sector 
wages, further affected by greater flexibility. So, while average earnings fell by around 
30%, fees for LTC services would have fallen by more than the price level. So, pensioners’ 
relative income position improved, as relative prices of care services declined, enabled 
by flexible working. If the ease of evading tax is factored in, the expectation of falling 
care prices is reinforced. 
However, relative prices only tell half the story. They could only work due to the radical 
transformation of women’s attitudes towards work. This was helped by the arrival of 
female immigrants in the 1990s, who enabled the operation of an affordable market for 
personal services. This had allowed the expansion of female labour force participation 
in the period to 2007. Despite the supply of migrant carers being depleted by 
outmigration, women rejected reversion to traditional roles. Given inadequacy (and 
retrenchment) of public provision, families sought market solutions to their care 
problems.  
A key message is that, despite difficulties, families are coping – with social indicators 
such as the care gap improving (or at least deteriorating by less than financial indicators). 
It should be stressed that this is unlikely to be costless; there is ample evidence that 
balancing conflicting needs and duties is taking a toll in peoples’ psychology and in other 
dimensions. 
What of public policy? It is clear, that public attention is absorbed by what happens to 
pensions. The vacillations in the coverage of LTC costs in the AWG reports can be 
interpreted as due to complacency that families are coping. Will they continue to cope, 
all the way to 2070, without any help  from the State? Yet, this is what Greece has 
accepted, by projecting that demographic deterioration will rocket their estimated 
public expenditure of 0.01% of GDP, all the way to 0.02% of GDP.  
Our analysis showed that the private care sector, that is, Greek families, met immediate 
needs since 2007. However, it requires a leap of faith to say that this can remain a 
sustainable option for the long term. This implies that a discussion of whether LTC is 
ready for the ageing challenge is long overdue. 
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Even in the medium term, out of pocket expenses are a drain on resources, which are 
under threat from many directions. Pensions are due to fall again in 2019. Another major 
problem is the supply of carers; foreign migrant carers are falling in numbers. The gap 
could be filled by tapping into the labour supply of pensioners who retire early. 
However, obstacles exist: the 2016 pensions law restricts many such sources 
(restrictions placed on the part-time employment of pensioners; disincentives for self-
employed individuals or for caring as second job). 
The refugee crisis could be an opportunity to fill the supply gap, especially as former 
waves of 1990s migrant themselves depart. However, for this potential to be realised, 
considerable changes of attitudes need to take place. These are both policy towards 
their integration, but also on the part of refugees themselves regarding their personal 
goals.  
These dilemmas may also have implications for the quality of care. That, in an 
unregulated market with little or no quality control is likely to vary and to be subject to 
downward pressures as incomes are bid down further. In such a situation the presence 
of a robust high-quality public sector will act as a quality benchmark for the private 
sector.  
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APPENDIX 1 
The Data: 
The paper uses SHARE data. It compares the last pre-crisis Wave (2 -2007) with the latest 
Wave available (6 -2015). The latter year followed the end of the second bailout in 
December 2014 and spanned the period of confrontational negotiations leading to the 
third (August 2015). SHARE is well suited to track the fortunes of people aged 50+ over 
the crisis (Börsch-Supan et al. 2013). It contains interdisciplinary, internationally and 
intertemporally comparable panel data, adapted to the difficulties of sampling an older 
population. 
Greece had participated in the first three SHARE waves (2004, 2007, 2009) -pre crisis. It 
re-joined the survey in w6 (2015). It was possible to revisit the 3,500 respondents who 
had participated in the first waves; a refresher sample was added for those who became 
50 since 2007, and enlarging sample size for older ages, reaching an overall sample size 
of 5,000 in 2015. The sample size for Greece of those aged 65+ which will be used in the 
analysis is shown in Table A1. 
 
Table A1: SHARE sample size for Greece, per age categories per wave 
 
age  
50-64 
age  
65-80 
age  
80+ 
sub-sample 
65+ 
Total sample 
(age 50+) 
Wave 6 2,262 2,091 582 2,673 4,935 
Wave 2 1,888 1,222 301 1,523 3,411 
Panel sample  
(wave 2-wave 6)1 688 1,088 335 1,423 2,111 
Total sample size all 
countries, Wave 6 28,391 31,142 8,686 39,828 68,219 
 
We also, for the first time in Greece, investigate ‘exit interviews’, proxy interviews 
probing the conditions surrounding the demise of panel members – the last year of life 
of those who died between waves. Table A2 presents the sample size based on wave 5 
and wave 6, by group of country; a sample size of 350 is sufficient for most descriptive 
analyses. Figure A1 shows the median age of the exit interviews sample used in the 
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analysis, by gender. We must bear in mind that the age distribution (where the age of 
death in Greece appears at the top end) is a reflection of the length of time spent in the 
survey. This is higher in Greece as (a) deaths are counted since 2009 and not 2013 and 
(b) the retention rate of the survey is higher in Greece.  
 
Table A2: Sample size by gender, deceased persons (SHARE w5 & w6 exit interviews) 
country Men Women Total 
Nordics (SE, DK, NL) 400 364 764 
Continental (DE, BE, FR, CH, AT)  658 613 1,271 
Southern (IT, ES, PT) 639 564 1,203 
Greece 150 200 350 
Eastern (CZ, PL, SI, EE) 870 747 1617 
Total 2,717 2,488 5,205 
Source: SHARE wave 5 (2013) and SHARE wave 6 (2015) exit interviews. 
 
Figure A1: Median age at the moment of decease, SHARE wave 5 and SHARE wave 6 
 
Source: SHARE wave 5 (2013) and SHARE wave 6 (2015) exit interviews. 
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APPENDIX 2 
The supply of Long-Term Care: Τhe Institutional background in Greece 
Home-based care: Home-based care is the preferred type of care in Greece. In 1997 the 
program ‘Help at Home’ was launched at municipality level. Until 2003, beneficiaries 
were older people with difficulties in daily activities. In 2003 it was expanded to persons 
regardless of age, with a disability rate of >67% (sufficient for a disability pensions). 
Beneficiaries are persons older than 78 with difficulties in daily activities as judged by 
social workers plus the officially disabled (>67%). Three additional criteria apply: (i) they 
live alone or with another old person in need of care, (ii) have personal annual income 
less than €7.700 and family income less than €15.400, (iii) not receiving public allowance 
for disability and (iv) not living in a Care Home (Ministerial Decision, FEK B 1240/11-04-
2012). 
Public opinion considers ‘Help at Home’ a successful public program. It serves 
approximately 72,000 beneficiaries per year; it employs 3,200 persons and has an 
annual budget of approximately EUR 60M, which amounts for a public spending of €70 
per beneficiary per month. Funding of the program proved a challenge and has still to 
become part of the regular government budget. Until 2011, it was financed by structural 
funds, while since then it is paid for a combination of the Generational Solidarity Fund 
(AKAGE), the Ministry of Employment, the Social Security Organization (EFKA) and the 
Ministry of Interior (Law 4483/2017; EETAA, Administrative data, 2017). 
Home-based care is also delivered by private companies or non-profit organizations, 
which provide care services, paid out of pocket by recipients or their families. 
Administrative data for informal care are not available, but surveys suggest it may be 
widespread (Tinios et al. 2017). 
Residential care: The foundation and operation of care homes for the elderly is regulated 
by specific rules (FEK B 1136/6-7-2007). Care homes, regardless of ownership, operate 
at municipality level under the supervision of the Ministry of Employment. Ministry data, 
show for 2016 241 care homes, of which 10 were publicly owned (State or 
municipalities), 129 were non-profit organizations (mostly Church) and 112 private 
companies. The number of people living in homes was 10,658 of whom almost 50% in 
 
 
37 
private-owned care homes. Care homes employ 4,322 employees; 44% work in the 
private sector and 56% in non-profit or state-owned organizations (Ministry of 
Employment, 2017). Care homes funding comes from donations, subsidies from the 
Ministry of Employment, Prefectures and frequently a levy on the beneficiary’s pension. 
For-profit organizations are financed by out-of-pocket payments based on market 
prices. The above mentioned combination of finance lacks transparency; rumours are 
rife that elderly people are forced to ‘donate’ part of their assets, under to non-profit 
organizations operating care homes. 
As to the quality of care, the lack of coherent public policies -that would assess and 
evaluate care provision in Care Homes - leads to low level of care provision quality. No 
quality survey has ever been undertaken. 
Day care centres for the elderly (KIFI) operate at municipality level financed by the state. 
They provide care services during the day to elderly who are not fully autonomous, face 
financial difficulties, and their families cannot take care of them during the day due to 
employment obligations. Ministry data show 74 day centres operated in 2016, taking 
care of 1,600 of persons in need of care (Ministerial Decision, FEK B 1397/22-10-2001; 
Ministry of Employment 2017).Cash Allowances: For serious health problems, which 
result to a disability rate over 50%, and after an evaluation from public health 
authorities, cash allowances are given to beneficiaries.    
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APPENDIX 3 
Ascertaining need of care 
The definition of in-need-of care is not straightforward. Different countries follow 
different approaches in characterizing a person as vulnerable, being in-need-of care 
(Brugiavini et al. 2017), while even the European Commission’s DGECFIN finds it difficult 
to conclude on a definitive definition.  
In the 2009 Ageing Report, the projected number of dependent persons was based on 
the percentage of persons that had reported 1 or more ADL limitations (based on SHARE 
data). After 2012, the projected number of dependent persons is based on persons 
reporting severe limitations in ‘usual activities’ because of health problems for at least 
6 months, based on EU SILC data, while 'usual activities' are not specified. DG ECFIN 
notes there are many people with some form of disability who can lead completely 
independent lives without the need for care services. Further, dependency as reported 
in EU-SILC also depends on a person’s perception of his or her ability to perform 
activities associated with daily living.  
Thus, on the one hand survey data can underestimate some forms of disability and on 
the other hand, disability data can be too inclusive and capture relatively minor 
difficulties in functioning that do not require LTC. 
Regarding eligibility criteria per country to receive public long term care, in some 
countries the sole criterion is limitations in performing ADL or iADL activities, without 
examining how severe those limitations are (e.g. Czech Republic); in other there is rating 
of care needed based on the level of seriousness of those limitations (Spain, Belgium) 
and on others, 2 ADL limitations is considered the threshold for receiving public care 
while the level of seriousness of the limitations may also be a criterion (e.g. Germany). 
The algorithm for defining the type and the frequency of public care provision differs 
among countries -and in some cases even among prefectures of the same country-, 
taking into account additional parameters such as age or severe illness (Brugiavini et al. 
2017).   
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